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Data on neuropsychiatric and behavioral genetics have attracted legal interest, as attorneys explore their use
in criminal and civil cases. These developments may assist judges and juries in making difficult judgments—
but they bring substantial risk of misinterpretation and misuse.Advances in understanding genetic pre-
dispositions to behavioral and neuropsy-
chiatric syndromes are squarely in the
sights of the legal profession. With data
suggesting substantial genetic contri-
butions to the risk for criminal behavior
(Tuvblad et al., 2011), attorneys have
begun to explore the potential uses of ge-
netic evidence in their clients’ defense
(Denno, 2011). In addition, the first signs
that genetic data may be of interest to
the civil justice system have begun to
appear. As is true whenever scientific
data are introduced in court, these devel-
opments hold potential for assisting
judges and juries with some of the difficult
judgments that they face—but they also
bring a substantial risk of misinterpreta-
tion and misuse.
In considering current and future uses
of behavioral and neuropsychiatric ge-
netic evidence, the unhappy history of
genetics in the courtroom cannot be
ignored. Even before the structure of
DNA was identified and the transmission
of genetic information elucidated, courts
recognized that behavioral traits could
be handed down in families. However,
judges’ understanding of genetics typi-
cally reflected the science of the day,
and the consequences of their reliance
on contemporary knowledge were not
always salutary. For example, in the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in Buck v. Bell
(274 U.S. 200, 1927), which upheld Virgin-
ia’s involuntary sterilization statute, Jus-
tice Oliver Wendell Holmes, appealing to
the popular view that intellectual disability
was passed from parent to child and was
associated with promiscuity and crime,
notoriously declared, ‘‘It is better for all
the world, if instead of waiting to execute
degenerate offspring for crime, or to let946 Neuron 82, June 4, 2014 ª2014 Elsevierthem starve for their imbecility, society
can prevent thosewho aremanifestly unfit
from continuing their kind.’’
Presumptions about the relationship
between crime and hereditary intellectual
deficiencies appear to have influenced
the lower courts as well, with defendants
who were viewed as ‘‘defective delin-
quents’’ often sent to state institutions
where they could be confined indefinitely,
rather than being sentenced to a fixed
term in a correctional facility (Willrich,
1998). But the first use of genetic tests in
the courts for their presumed relationship
to criminal behavior did not arrive until the
late 1960s and was based on data pur-
porting to show that the XYY karyotype
was linked to violent crime (Denno,
1996). Derived from a number of studies
demonstrating overrepresentation of
XYY men in correctional populations, the
data were recruited by enterprising de-
fense attorneys to argue that their clients’
violence was driven by genetic factors
beyond their control, and thus that they
could not be held criminally responsible
for their behavior. Courts, however, were
skeptical about the validity of data sug-
gesting a causal link between the XYY
karyotype and violent behavior and
generally declined to admit karyotyping
of defendants into evidence. As it turned
out, the courts’ skepticism was fully
justified—the purported link between
XYY and violence has never been gener-
ally accepted (Stochholm et al., 2012).
Genetic Evidence in Criminal Court
Since the mid-1990s, a more sophisti-
cated set of claims based on genetic
predispositions to criminal behavior and
neuropsychiatric syndromes has made
its way into the criminal courts. TheseInc.arguments have taken two forms. As
suggested by the attempts to introduce
testimony about a defendant’s XYY
karyotype, one potential use for genetic
data is to support a claim that the defen-
dant has a neuropsychiatric or behavioral
condition that negates criminal liability.
Anglo-American law traditionally has
excused from criminal responsibility a
defendant whose actions were driven by
a distorted understanding of the nature
or wrongfulness of her behavior (e.g., a
delusional belief that she was being
threatened by another person) or, in
some jurisdictions, an inability to control
her behavior. This approach forms the
basis for the insanity defense, which all
but a handful of American jurisdictions
embrace in one form or another. In princi-
ple, a defendant could claim that a
genetic predisposition to impulsive or
criminal behavior rendered her incapable
of understanding or controlling her ac-
tions, and some legal writers have argued
for consideration of this approach (Jones,
2003).
However, being predisposed to certain
kinds of behavior does not necessarily
indicate that one is unaware of its wrong-
fulness or is unable to behave otherwise.
Since the threshold for establishing
claims of nonresponsibility is quite high,
most expert commentators believe that
genetic predisposition evidence cannot
meet the legal standard for nonculpability
(Morse, 2011). Hence, rather than intro-
ducing genetic evidence during the guilt
phase of their trial, defendants who have
been convicted may prefer instead to
employ genetic evidence to argue for
mitigation of their sentences. The usual
basis for a claim for mercy in sentencing
is that a genetic predisposition makes it
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behavior compared with other people,
and thus he is not deserving of the most
severe punishment for his offense. Such
arguments might have particular traction
in capital cases, since the death penalty
is generally reserved only for the most
culpable murderers. Although parties
seeking to introduce scientific evidence
in court bear the burden of demonstrating
its validity, judges tend to be fairly per-
missive at death penalty hearings—yet
another reason that one might expect ge-
netic evidence to appear more commonly
in such cases.
The best look at the current role of
behavioral and neuropsychiatric genetic
evidence in the criminal courts confirms
this view. Denno (2011), surveying re-
ported cases from 2007–2011, found 33
instances in which the defense sought
to admit genetic information in a criminal
trial. (Because most criminal cases do
not result in written opinions, the reported
cases on which she drew were largely
cases that reached the appellate stage.
Hence, the actual number of cases
involving genetic evidence may well
be larger.) Her previous survey of cases
from 1994–2007 had identified 44 cases
in which an attempt was made to
introduce genetic evidence, suggesting
modest but growing interest in utilizing
such data.
Denno found genetic evidence was
almost always limited to death penalty
cases and almost invariably for mitigation.
Most cases involved an effort to demon-
strate that the defendant had a serious
condition that may have created inherent
difficulties in controlling behavior and
thus did not deserve the death penalty.
For the most common of these condi-
tions—substance dependence—genetic
evidence had the additional value of
suggesting that the behavior was not the
defendant’s fault. Other conditions that
genetic evidence was introduced to
support included a range of serious
mental illnesses (including schizophrenia
and depression) and intellectual disability,
as well as hereditary propensities to
engage in violence or other criminal
behavior. Additional findings included an
increasing willingness on the part of
courts to admit genetic arguments, the
absence of attempts by the prosecution
to turn genetic evidence against defen-dants (e.g., by suggesting that a genetic
predisposition indicates enhanced
dangerousness), and uncertainty as to
the impact of genetic evidence. Of note,
almost all cases involved genetic argu-
ments made on the basis of family history
data; use of actual genetic tests in this
series was rare.
It is clear from other sources, however,
that genetic tests for traits presumed to
be associated with criminal behavior
are also being presented to the courts,
although the frequency of attempts to
introduce such evidence is unclear.
Published reports indicate that such
testimony is most often based on findings
linking a number of gene variants to crim-
inal behavior (Bernet et al., 2007; Rigoni
et al., 2010). Themost discussed example
is monoamine oxidase A (MAOA), prob-
ably the best-studied gene linked to anti-
social behavior. In a study of a Dutch
kindred, complete absence of MAOA
activity was associated with impulsive,
criminal behavior among men (MAOA is
carried on the X chromosome) (Brunner
et al., 1993). A subsequent, influential
study by Caspi and colleagues (2002) of
an epidemiologic cohort in New Zealand
demonstrated a gene 3 environment
interaction (GxE) between lower activity
alleles of MAOA and childhood maltreat-
ment. With multiple confirmatory studies
(and some failures to confirm), this finding
has generally withstood scrutiny (Baum,
2013) and may be among the better-sup-
ported GxE findings in behavioral ge-
netics (Duncan et al., 2014).
As with other genetic evidence, MAOA
findings have generally been used in
murder trials, sometimes to suggest
diminished capacity of the defendant to
premeditate his criminal behavior, but
most often for purposes of mitigation
at sentencing. Courts’ responses to
attempts to introduce these data have
been mixed, with some excluding it on
the basis that the science has not been
developed sufficiently to establish the
validity of the relationship between the
genetic findings and the defendant’s
behavior. Even when introduced, though,
the impact of the evidence has often been
less than striking. However, there are
three reported cases—one from the U.S.
and two from Italy—in which courts
appear to have relied on evidence from
MAOA and other genes (including DRD4,NeuroCOMT, and SLC6A4), along with neuroi-
maging data suggesting impaired brain
function, as grounds for mitigation of
sentences (Greely, 2011; Walker, 2013).
Indeed, some experimental data sup-
port the likely efficacy of genetic evidence
in influencing sentencing decisions. As-
pinwall and colleagues (2012), surveying
a sample of state trial court judges, found
that those judges who read a vignette
in which a genetic basis was suggested
for the defendant’s psychopathy were
inclined to give significantly lower senten-
ces than judges who were not told about
a genetic basis for the defendant’s con-
dition. However, the absolute differences
were modest: a mean sentence of
approximately 13 years in the genetic
evidence condition compared with nearly
14 years in the control condition. Mem-
bers of the general public, however, may
be less likely to see genetic evidence as
mitigating. In a vignette study from our
group that was modeled on the MAOA 3
childhood maltreatment interaction, a
representative sample of the U.S. popula-
tion did not assign lower levels of respon-
sibility or shorter sentenceswhen told that
the defendant had a genetic propensity
for violence compared with a control
group not exposed to genetic evidence
(Appelbaum and Scurich, 2014). Respon-
dents in the genetic evidence group,
though, manifested greater fear of the
defendant, suggesting some broader
cost to defense strategies based on ge-
netic arguments.
Use of behavioral genetic data in crim-
inal trials has been subject to criticism
from both scientific and legal perspec-
tives. Studies of the relationship of gene
variants to criminal behavior have often
failed to replicate, calling into question
the validity or at least the robustness of
the original findings (Duncan et al.,
2014). Even the MAOA 3 childhood
maltreatment interaction is neither a
highly sensitive nor specific marker for
criminal behavior, making it difficult to
apply group data on the impact of genes
on behavior to individual cases (Buckholtz
and Meyer-Lindenberg, 2013). A limited
number of populations (generally white
and of European descent) have been
studied, and interactions with other
genes and other environmental stimuli
are largely unexplored. Hence, expert
witnesses who offer testimony regardingn 82, June 4, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 947
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fluence on his behavior may be overstat-
ing the certainty of their conclusions.
From the legal side have come ques-
tions regarding the probative value of
genetic evidence for issues of concern
to the law. As Morse (2011) has noted,
‘‘A genetic predisposition to criminal
conduct does not per se mitigate or
excuse. Causation is only relevant if it
tends to show the presence of a genuine
excusing condition, but it is the latter
that does the legal work.’’ Many defen-
dants experience pressures to commit
criminal acts—from peer encouragement
to the disinhibiting effect of intoxicating
substances—but in general we expect
them to resist the urge to act illegally or
suffer the consequences. Unless a defen-
dant’s genetic endowment substantially
impairs her ability to appreciate the
wrongfulness of her conduct or to obey
the requirements of the law, genetic influ-
ences may simply be one more pressure
that she is expected to resist. Finally,
from a policy perspective, since there
are currently no proven treatments for
the genetic conditions that are posited
as mitigating in these cases, facilitating
an earlier return to society for (noncapital)
offenders who are at higher risk of future
criminal acts may be a self-defeating
approach.
Genetic Evidence in Civil Court
Much less attention has been given to
possible uses of behavioral and neuro-
psychiatric evidence in civil proceedings,
although one instance was recently re-
ported. In a case involving a claim against
a landlord for injuries suffered in a fire, an
Alberta court compelled a plaintiff with a
family history of Huntington’s disease
(HD) to undergo genetic testing for the
disorder to determine whether her impair-
ment was related to the fire or to HD
(Adacsi v. Amin, 2013 ABCA 315, Ct.
App. Alberta). Compelled genetic testing
has not previously been reported, but
courts can require plaintiffs who place
their medical conditions in contention to
undergo medical examinations or tests,
unless such procedures could endanger
their lives or health. That most people
with family histories of HD elect not to
know whether they carry the mutation
for the disorder makes the choice faced
by the plaintiff in Adacsi, i.e., have the948 Neuron 82, June 4, 2014 ª2014 Elseviertesting or forego compensation for in-
juries that may have resulted from the
fire, particularly poignant.
In addition to helping courts determine
the cause of conditions allegedly due to
negligence of a defendant in a tort claim,
behavioral and neuropsychiatric genetic
evidence could be relevant in a number
of other circumstances. Employers con-
testing work-related mental disability
claims might, like the defendants in
Adacsi, want to compel claimants to
undergo genetic testing to prove that an
underlying disorder was not responsible
for their impairment. Divorcing couples
in child-custody disputes, in which
court-ordered psychological evaluations
are routine, may want to add genetic
testing for behavioral traits or neuropsy-
chiatric disorders to the list of procedures
that their estranged spouses must un-
dergo to assess their fitness to parent a
child. Plaintiffs seeking to establish that
a defendant acted recklessly (e.g., in
precipitating an auto accident) might
attempt to seek data regarding the defen-
dant’s genetic predisposition to impulsive
behavior. With increasing utilization of
next-generation sequencing in medical
settings, and arguments being made for
sequencing newborns at birth, adverse
parties in civil litigation may not need to
compel genetic testing but merely to
seek access to existing data.
Utilization of genetic tests in civil cases,
for the foreseeable future, will be con-
strained by the limited predictive capacity
of most current genetic findings related
to behavioral traits and neuropsychiatric
disorders. The situation in Adacsi, after
all, involving a gene with complete pene-
trance (albeit variable age of onset), is
vanishingly rare. But as predictive algo-
rithms are developed for disorders that
involve the interaction of multiple genes,
and as more alleles of moderate effect
are identified (e.g., ApoE4), we can expect
to see more efforts made to introduce
genetic evidence in civil cases as well.
Conclusion
The courts are in a period of exploration
regarding the uses of behavioral and
neuropsychiatric genetic evidence, an
effort that is likely to continue so long as
there are advances in understanding ge-
netic influences on behavior and behav-
ioral disorders. As genetics becomes aInc.more frequent visitor to the courtroom,
however, the risk that genetic information
will be misinterpreted will be real. At the
extreme, we may see judges presuming
genetic bases for criminal behavior in the
absence of any reliable evidence to that
effect (U.S. v. Cossey, 632 F.3d 82, 2d
Cir. 2011). More subtly, legal finders of
fact, whether judges or juries, may over-
estimate (or sometimes, underestimate)
the conclusions that can be drawn from
genetic evidence, thus unfairly distorting
the legal process. It will be an ongoing
challenge for both legal and genetic ex-
perts to monitor the use of genetic data
in the courts to ensure that the conclu-
sions drawn validly reflect the science.ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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